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I
N 1995 when the WTO was established, it seemed to be final confirmation
of the success of a system that had managed multilateral trade relations
since 1947. It provided an institutional framework within which governments
were not only able to negotiate reductions in trade barriers but also to bind
themselves to rules of conduct that, in principle, were both universal and non-
discriminatory. About the same time, however, the new wave of regional and
bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) was beginning to gather strength. For
some, this has emerged as a threat to the central role of the WTO as manager
of the trading system and even to presage the fading of an era of multilateral-
ism in trade relations. For others, it has been a call to revise long-held concep-
tions about the multilateral system and to embrace a more complex world
composed of networks of multilateral, plurilateral, regional and bilateral
arrangements. In this article, we aim to contribute to this debate by exploring
how far FTAs have strengthened or weakened global governance of the trading
system.
For the most part, the contribution of economists to the debate has centred
around the effects of preferential tariff regimes (including their rules of origin)
on merchandise trade and trade relations. We think that the almost exclusive
focus on tariff regimes is too narrow a prism. For one thing, we are sceptical
of the practical significance of the tariff preferences that have been actually
introduced in affecting trade flows. More important, the focus on tariff barriers
leaves aside the other major aspects of trade relations that multilateral, plurilat-
eral, regional and bilateral arrangements seek to address. Central to theseWe wish to thank an anonymous referee for comments on an earlier version of this article.
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332 A. G. BROWN AND R. M. STERNarrangements is the removal of a host of non-tariff obstacles, found both at the
border and in domestic regulations, through the adoption by governments of
more convergent regulatory practices. In a world of deepening economic inte-
gration, the regulatory aspects of trade agreements have rapidly been assuming
increasing importance. Indeed, the future progress of integration will be partly
conditional on how successful governments are in making mutual accommoda-
tions in their domestic regulatory networks to facilitate flows of trade,
investment and technology.
We open with a brief analysis of the altered political and economic context
within which countries have come, in recent years, to assign a new importance
to regional and bilateral trade agreements in their trade policies. We then take
up each of the main provisions included in FTAs and comment on how these
may separately affect the management of trade relations.1 If we had to start
from scratch, this would be a formidable task indeed; but we are helped by a
number of recent studies noted in the References that have explored the charac-
teristics of recent FTAs, comparing and grouping them by their different fea-
tures. In the final section, we conclude by identifying a few of the broader
trends affecting global governance that are associated with the spread of trade
agreements as a whole.2. ALTERED CONTEXT
For the best part of 50 years after the Second World War, international trade
relations were largely managed by the multilateral system embodied in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and later incorporated into
the WTO. Customs unions or FTAs were of importance for some regions or
countries, but these were viewed as clearly subsidiary to the multilateral sys-
tem. Non-discrimination among nations, otherwise known as general most-
favored-nation (MFN) treatment, was a cornerstone of the system. It kept at
bay the deep-seated fear that, as in the interwar years, exclusionary trading
blocs might again arise to restrict market access.
The post-war transformation in the economic relations of the countries that
might formerly have dominated major trading blocs – the US, the larger Euro-
pean countries and Japan – greatly diminished that fear. As a group, these
countries became quite closely integrated in manufacturing production and
trade, in the service industries, in cross-border direct investment, and (as we1 Some trade agreements are component parts of broader agreements that address political and eco-
nomic relations more generally; they are as much instruments of foreign policy as a means of regu-
lating commercial relations. We confine our attention here to those provisions in the agreements
that impinge directly on trade and investment flows.
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potential leader of an East Asian bloc, has also become heavily dependent on
access to Western markets. The multilateral, and largely non-discriminatory,
character of relations among these countries, moreover, has been institutionally
embedded in their national laws and regulations in conformity with their
obligations under the GATT ⁄ WTO agreements.
It was within this changed setting of diminished rivalry that, in the 1980s,
a resurgence of interest in regional FTAs took place. The new focus was on
the expansion of markets, of possibly promoting broader economic integrations
and even – as had occurred in Western Europe – of overcoming political antag-
onisms. Since the agreements rigorously avoided any raising of trade barriers
against third countries, they were not deemed protectionist, at least in intent.
Moreover, although there certainly remained a residual fear of the emergence
of possible trading blocs, that only acted as an additional stimulus to action.
The passage of the Single European Act in 1986, for instance, and the later
trade agreements of the EU with Eastern European countries after the collapse
of the Soviet Union were spurs to the signing of the US FTA with Canada and,
later, to the formation of NAFTA; and the US also began to entertain the
dream of a Free Trade Area of the Americas while it established an Asia and
Pacific Council as a precursor to another extensive free trade area.
Thus, in the new world of globalisation and of increasing reliance on
unrestricted private enterprise that the 1980s ushered in, the emphasis on non-
discrimination yielded to the search for ways to expand access to foreign mar-
kets. And it was but a small step to include bilateral agreements along with
regional agreements as an effective instrument. These kinds of arrangements,
moreover, had the advantage of not being dependent on the slow pace of multi-
lateral trade negotiations, which were being made more intricate and less con-
clusive by the growing number and diversity of the participants. Further,
particularly for the US as the leading economic and trading power, the interest
in market access was moving beyond the reductions of barriers at the border to
include access to service industries, such as telecommunications and finance as
well as access for investment capital in general. Securing access to specific
markets of interest was thus easier to realise through the negotiation of FTAs.
These shifts in attitude of the major trading powers, particularly of the US,
interacted with equally complex but different changes affecting the trade poli-
cies of many other countries, which were to become the demandeurs in
regional or bilateral trade agreements. In the western hemisphere, for example,
it was Canada that became the first country to approach the US with a proposal
to negotiate an FTA. It was motivated in part by an immediate concern that the
US was threatening to introduce new trade defence measures. More profound
was the dissatisfaction with the growth performance of Canadian industry. The
solution was partly seen in closer and more open trade links with the US to 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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oping worlds, were also embracing more open trade policies as part of their
growth or development strategies. A few, such as Chile, Mexico and Singapore,
began to actively pursue the negotiation of FTAs as a route towards the realisa-
tion of a universal free trade policy.
As more countries began to see the advantage in widening their markets for
exports through the negotiation of FTAs, this provided an additional incentive
for others to follow suit. In accordance with the domino theory that Baldwin
(2006) has so persuasively expounded, numerous countries feared that they
faced possible costs to themselves in remaining aloof from these preferential
arrangements.
While the new wave of regional and bilateral agreements has made for a
more complex network of trade relations among countries, the WTO disciplines
have nonetheless remained at the core of the global governance of trade rela-
tions. Most regional or bilateral agreements explicitly reaffirm their rights and
obligations under the WTO, and the multilateral disciplines provide a basic
framework around which these agreements are built. On certain major matters,
such as the definition of those domestic subsidies that may be considered to be
breaches of trade commitments, regional and bilateral agreements have been
unqualified in their acceptance of the WTO discipline. It is with the other pro-
visions, and their deviations from the WTO, that we are mainly concerned with
in what follows.3. CONTENTS OF REGIONAL AND BILATERAL AGREEMENTS2
We first take up those provisions, such as tariffs and services regulations that
are very largely concerned with market access, and we thereafter discuss those
other provisions like customs procedures and standards that are more in the
nature of supporting rules. There is, however, no sharp line of distinction
between the various provisions since the supporting rules may also affect mar-
ket access. The final provisions that we review – competition policy, and
labour and environmental standards – are those that lie largely or wholly out-
side the WTO body of agreements.a. Tariffs and Rules of Origin
The most serious objection to FTAs is the preferential treatment that they
introduce, most obviously in tariff regimes. Although MFN treatment has been2 An especially useful source of information on preferential agreements is Chauffour and Maur
(2011).
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bilateral trade agreements deliberately set such treatment aside. However, the
de facto importance of their preferential arrangements is probably a good deal
less than might be expected from the proliferation of these agreements. It is
unfortunate that the proportion of world trade actually conducted on preferen-
tial terms under these agreements is difficult to determine. For example,
a World Bank (2005) report estimated the proportion of world trade conducted
among countries that were partners in regional or bilateral trade agreements
was around one-third in 2002, and the number of agreements has increased
appreciably since that date. However, for reasons noted in the World Bank
report and elaborated upon below, that estimate grossly overstates the likely
volume of trade conducted on preferential terms. Thus, for example, exclusion
of the intra-trade of the EU alone reduces the 2002 figure from one-third to
one-fifth.3
Moreover, there are several reasons for scepticism about the practical signifi-
cance of the preferential arrangements. For one thing, although a large number
of agreements have been signed, these have not always fully specified their
programmes for tariff reduction or elimination, or they have envisaged imple-
mentation spread out over long periods. Broadly, with some notable exceptions,
it is in agreements to which developed countries are partners that the tariff
reductions and eliminations have been more firmly implemented. However, the
developed countries had already brought down their MFN tariffs to very low
levels. Thus, duties are, in fact, zero on a quarter to two-fifths of their imports,
and the duties on the remaining products average about 4 per cent (WTO
Annual Report, 2003). In the FTAs to which the developed countries are par-
ties, preferential tariffs on imports into their markets thus have limited value.
Indeed, for exporters, rates of duty are often too low to make it worthwhile to
conform to the process necessary to qualify for the preferential rate. In this
connection, Whalley (2008) noted an official Canadian finding (Government of
Canada, 2005) that perhaps as much as 70 per cent of its bilateral trade with
the US under NAFTA that was eligible for preferential rates actually took place
at MFN rates. Baldwin (2006) likewise noted that the utilisation rate in the
ASEAN FTA was very low, perhaps below 10 per cent.4 The point is that
where preferential margins are small, the certification process itself can incur3 Technically, the World Bank analysis includes all customs unions and FTAs that members have
notified to the WTO under GATT Article XXIV. This includes the EU. But it makes little sense to
include the EU in the present context of a discussion of how the proliferation of regional or bilateral
trading arrangements is affecting the management of the global trading system. The EU has been in
the process of evolution over the last 50 years and, compared with other such arrangements, is now
a closely integrated economic entity. A test of the difference is that it acts as such in trade
negotiations.
4 Relatively low utilisation rates have also been found among developing countries participating in
the General System of Preferences (Brown and Stern, 2007).
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tively low utilisation rates, however, is usually assigned to the production con-
ditions that exporters have to meet to comply with the rules of origin spelled
out in the agreements. Rules of origin in the agreements of developed countries
are generally product-specific and can run into several hundred pages of condi-
tions.6 Thus, the modest reductions in tariffs that these countries have been
able to offer are partly offset by their tight rules of origin. Indeed, in developed
countries FTAs with developing countries, it has usually been the latter that
have made the more significant tariff cuts (and rules of origin in the FTAs of
developing countries appear, in the main, to be simpler and less protective).
Another restriction on the scope of regional and bilateral FTAs is that, as in
multilateral trade negotiations, they invariably exclude some products from the
liberalisation of trade barriers.7 The most common exclusions are agricultural
commodities. While many FTAs have taken the liberalisation of agricultural
trade in specific products beyond that achieved in multilateral negotiations, the
range of experience has been wide and most exclude some sensitive products.
Unsurprisingly, the excluded products in FTAs are the same sensitive products
identified in multilateral trade negotiations.
While the proportion of world trade conducted at preferential tariff rates is a
good deal less than might be imagined, it is nonetheless significant and has
been growing. The harmful spillover effects of preferences on third countries
are a valid source of concern in the management of international trade rela-
tions. Once again, however, we must caution that the adverse consequences are
less than what the prevalence of FTAs might lead one to suppose. Thus, third
countries have frequently responded with their own measures to counter the
threat or actuality of trade diversion. A common response has been to negotiate
a parallel agreement to preserve access to the trading partner’s market on equal
terms. This, in good part, accounts for the network of FTAs that links so many
countries – and it should also be remembered that the process of negotiating
these reactive agreements results in further trade liberalisation. Another5 Plummer (2007) has noted that the cost has been estimated at 3–5 per cent of export value.
6 The rules of origin are often complex. Brenton and Manchin (2003) noted that in the EU’s bilat-
eral agreements, the basic rule is that the product has to undergo changes at the four-digit level of
the Harmonized System of tariff classification. However, for many products, it is not this rule that
applies; instead, the products have to undergo specified technical changes. Value added is another
criterion and, although it is infrequently used, the relatively high figure is indicative of how restric-
tive rules of origin can be. In the EU, the necessary domestic value added is about 60 per cent
(McQueen, 2002). In NAFTA, the local content requirement for cars imported from Mexico to the
US is 62.5 per cent. An exception to the usually complex rules of origin in developed countries is
the New Zealand–Singapore agreement in which the rules are based on tariff transformation or a
simple 40 per cent value added (Plummer, 2007).
7 Article XXIV of GATT requires that, to qualify as a free trade area, ‘substantially all the trade’ in
products should be covered. While many interpret this as 95 per cent of bilateral trade flows, the
EU, for instance, sees this as 90 per cent.
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lessen the diversion through the lowering of MFN tariffs.8
It is not only preferential tariffs, however, that may cause trade diversion.
Restrictive rules of origin can be similar in effect. Since the rules of origin in
FTAs generally permit only bilateral accumulation,9 the source of inputs
required for the production of exported products from one trading partner may
shift from a third country to the other trading partner to qualify for preferential
treatment even though the production costs of the latter are higher. This kind
of problem can arise in acute form when a major trading country has FTAs
with several other countries so that the relationship takes on a hub-and-spoke
form. It is particularly harmful to trade in a world where the fragmentation of
production processes means that the different phases of production can be most
economically located in several countries. If the rules of origin do not allow
for the inclusion of imports from other countries with FTAs, they impede the
locational fragmentation of production. Eastern European countries in FTAs
with the EU experienced this problem. It was only after several years that the
EU finally reformed its rules of origin to permit diagonal cumulation among
itself and its trading partners.10 Baldwin (2006) has pointed out that the motive
for reform was the trend towards outsourcing among EU firms. Formerly pro-
tected from the competition of free trade partners by the rules of origin,
EU firms later found that the same rules prevented them from exploiting the
advantage of ‘unbundling’ their production among several cheaper locations.
Baldwin also noted that among the East Asian countries, where the dispersion
of fragmented production processes accounts in no small part for the rapid
growth of regional intra-trade, there was no network of FTAs to impede the
outsourcing process. What did happen was that competition among countries in
the region, to make themselves attractive sites for outsourced activity, led to
the reduction or elimination of tariffs on the inputs to be further processed.
What can we conclude from this thumbnail review of tariffs and rules of ori-
gin in regional and bilateral trade agreements? Baldwin and Venables (1997)
observed some time ago that, ‘despite some theoretical ambiguities, regional
integration agreements seem to have generated welfare gains for the partici-
pants, with small, but possibly negative spillovers on to the rest of the world’.8 For example, Tovias (1999) has noted that after Israel had signed trade agreements with both the
US and the EU, it found that because its preferential margins were relatively large, the cost (before
duty) of imported consumer goods, which had come mostly from Asian countries, rose significantly.
The response of the government was to lower MFN tariffs.
9 Bilateral accumulation allows the inputs originating in each partner country to be counted as
although they originated in the other.
10 Diagonal cumulation means that the input originating from any countries in a common trading
zone is allowed to be used for production of the ultimate product, where more than two countries
are party to a single agreement or several countries are incorporated to each other with similar
agreements.
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conflict between the multilateral system and these preferential agreements is
not the trade liberalisation that occurs but is rather the instances of trade diver-
sion. However, as noted, countries have often responded to the threat of diver-
sion with their own offsetting countermeasures. But this is not to deny that
trade diversion exists and can be very damaging for individual firms or indus-
tries in particular instances. More might be done therefore to lessen the possi-
ble conflict on this score between the multilateral system and FTAs. As other
have suggested, assessments of the effects of proposed FTAs on third countries
might point to some accommodations that could be made, for instance, by
means of some reduction by the free trade partner of tariffs that provoke the
diversion.11 Much the same holds true of rules of origin.12b. Services
While a General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) was successfully
negotiated during the Uruguay Round, progress at the multilateral level in
enlarging market access for services was decidedly limited. That was doubtless
in part because of the reluctance of countries to open their markets to foreign
competition, but it also owes something to the complexity of negotiating
reforms in the service industries multilaterally. The markets for the numerous
kinds of services that can be traded not only differ from each other in their
characteristics; they are also subject to national laws and regulations that often
vary substantially among countries in their content. There is much less scope
for the more straightforward kind of across-the-board reciprocal reductions in
barriers that have been so successful in lowering tariffs on goods at the multi-
lateral level. Moreover, under the GATS, countries take a ‘positive list’
approach to the liberalisation of services, meaning that they indicate their will-
ingness to negotiate reductions in barriers only on those services included in
the list. This restricts the possibilities for the negotiation of reciprocal reduc-
tions within the service sector as a whole.
Greater progress has been made through FTAs in improving foreign access
to domestic markets for services. Roy et al. (2008) found that, overall, commit-
ments in FTAs went significantly beyond GATS offers in terms of sectoral cov-
erage and levels of commitment for both Mode 1 (cross-border) and Mode 311 In 2006, as part of the Doha Round, the Negotiating Group on Rules formally approved a new
WTO transparency mechanism for regional trade agreements. The Committee on Regional Trade
Agreements will conduct reviews of any notified regional trade agreement on the basis of a factual
presentation by the WTO Secretariat. This is an opportunity for some analysis of the consequences
of an agreement for third countries.
12 See Baldwin (2006) for a detailed discussion of the possible role of the WTO in lessening the
distortions caused by rules of origin.
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particularly evident among countries – most notably, the US and its bilateral
trading partners – that have taken a ‘negative list’ approach, meaning that they
have included all services except those specifically named. They have been
successful in improving access to key sectors, such as telecommunications and
financial services, and they have also been able to agree on the binding of
existing access to many sectors, thus providing a basis for future liberalisation.
FTAs have also enabled exporters to focus their lobbying activities on the par-
ticular countries and sectors in which they are most interested (Hoekman,
2008). Further, it may well be that FTAs, being limited to so few negotiating
partners, provide an easier framework within which the countries can find ways
of accommodating their differences in the aims and purposes of their regula-
tions relating to specific services. It has to be added, however, that another rea-
son derives from the large asymmetries in power between partners in some
FTAs. The weaker partners are subject to greater bargaining pressures than at
the multilateral level.
It has to be assumed that, at least in principle, the improvements in market
access gained through FTAs would accord preferential status to the service pro-
viders from the trading partners; and this is a possible disadvantage. First mov-
ers in liberalisation may be reluctant to see their benefits extended to the firms
of other countries. However, little is known empirically about such possible
effects of preferences. It may be that, after agreeing to bilateral reductions in
regulatory barriers, countries begin to apply the reformed regulations to
firms from other trading partners. Rules of origin, moreover, for services
in FTAs may also be problematic, lessening the effectiveness of any stated
preferences.13c. Government Procurement
For a number of countries, greater access to the government procurement
market has been an important aim in negotiating regional or bilateral agree-
ments. For those that are already signatories to the plurilateral WTO Agreement
on Government Procurement, the FTAs serve to enhance transparency in
requirements relating to tendering and the reward of contracts. For countries
that are not signatories to the Agreement (which provides for non-discrimination
and national treatment), the FTAs open up markets on a strictly preferential
basis.
Many FTAs, however, contain no provisions at all relating to the opening up
of this market. Numerous countries, especially emerging countries, lean
towards the protection of their government procurement market, partly because13 For further discussion, see Fink and Molinuevo (2008) and Roy et al. (2008).
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genous enterprises and, sometimes, also because it may be a fruitful source of
rent-seeking activity. Even among developed countries, the reciprocal nature of
any agreement may deter trading partners from pressing for greater openness.14
In brief, while most countries have been reluctant to liberalise their govern-
ment procurement markets either multilaterally or bilaterally, some have nego-
tiated FTAs that have served to reinforce the WTO Agreement and only a few
have done so preferentially.d. Investment
The major instruments regulating commercial relations with regard to invest-
ment have been the bilateral investment treaties (BITs) drawn up between
countries and, more recently, the international investment agreements (IIAs)
incorporated into FTAs. This network of treaties and agreements, while cer-
tainly a component in the global governance of international commercial rela-
tions, stands quite apart from the WTO disciplines.
There has been a very substantial upsurge in the negotiation of BITs since
the early 1990s and, more recently, with the proliferation of FTAs, of IIAs. It
is noteworthy, moreover, that quite a number of emerging countries, some of
which are now home to world-class multinational corporations and ⁄ or have
firms managing international production across the borders of several neigh-
bouring states, have negotiated BITs or IIAs with other poor countries as well
as with the rich countries.
BITs and IIAs overshadow the principal WTO agreements addressing invest-
ment, namely, the Trade Related Investment Measures Agreement (TRIMS)
and the GATS. TRIMS is confined to prohibiting the application of certain per-
formance measures to FDI. The GATS is broader in that it addresses the issue
of right of establishment; that is, market access for foreign investments that
relate to services. In contrast, BITs have taken up more fundamental matters
relating to the security of foreign investments, such as their standard of treat-
ment, financial transfers, expropriation and compensation, key personnel and
dispute settlement. Some of the IIAs embodied in FTAs – those following the
NAFTA model – have gone much further. They have addressed questions of
entry and performance requirements as well as of the security of investments.
They have sought, in other words, to establish national treatment for foreign
investments at both the pre-establishment and post-establishment stages, at least
in most sectors. Such conditions differentiate these FTAs markedly from the
WTO disciplines as vehicles for liberalising investment flows.14 For instance, perhaps because of the difficulty of obtaining the agreement of all the member gov-
ernments, the EU has not sought extensive provisions in the agreements to which it is a signatory.
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eign investment. Unlike the NAFTA model agreements, most FTAs reserve to
the host country the general right to regulate the entry of foreign investment.
In other words, for most or all direct investments, national treatment is with-
held at the pre-establishment stage. Although well aware of the direct benefits
as well as the spillover benefits of foreign firms, host countries may fear that
foreign firms could crowd out smaller and currently less efficient domestic
enterprises and, especially in the public utilities sector, can establish entrenched
monopolistic positions. What additionally affects attitudes in many countries is
the emotional baggage that they have carried over from the colonial past when
foreign investments were perceived – rightly or wrongly – as exploitative con-
sequences of political domination.15
Most countries may also be cautious about the extent to which BITs or IIAs
could encroach upon their regulatory autonomy. These investment agreements
generally provide that individual foreign enterprises can take legal action against
states in the event that the terms of the agreements are breached. By invoking
the expropriation clauses in these agreements, a number of foreign-owned com-
panies have sued host governments on the grounds that the action of these gov-
ernments have had the effect of directly or indirectly expropriating foreign
assets, even if only in some partial way. Such a broad interpretation could place
serious constraints on the freedom of host governments to pursue certain poli-
cies, such as those affecting the environment or the health of the population.16
A further concern relates to the definition of investment employed in the
BITs or IIAs. In the NAFTA model agreements, for instance, investment has
been defined very broadly to include not only capital associated with FDI but
also portfolio investment and even intangible assets like intellectual property.
This can assume critical importance if or when host countries are faced with
currency crises. For example, in the Asian financial crisis, it was the volatility
of portfolio investment that aggravated the instability while the flow of FDI
remained relatively steady.
Because of the asymmetries of power, the bilateral agreements – BITs and
IIAs – have not protected weaker countries from being obliged to accept unde-
sired conditions. Nor have they been vehicles for advancing the principle of
non-discrimination. On the other hand, they have done much to provide an
environment favourable to foreign investment; and their bilateral nature may15 When the prime minister of India, Manmohan Singh, was finance minister, he said that India
was ‘not yet ready for right of establishment. You have to remember our history as a colony. The
East India Company came here as a trader and ended up owning the country’ (The Economist,
3 October 1998).
16 It appears, however, that in some new or renewed agreements, host governments have made
efforts to ensure that their freedom to determine social or environmental policies is no longer so
constrained.
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lar aims and circumstances.e. Intellectual Property Rights
Efforts to promote the international harmonisation of intellectual property
rights have a long history that dates back to the late nineteenth century. Agree-
ment on a common, internationally recognised set of rules was successfully
negotiated only during the Uruguay Round; and the incorporation of these
rules into the WTO made non-compliance subject to the WTO system of trade
sanctions.
Most FTAs have done little more than recognise their obligations under the
WTO Intellectual Property Agreement (TRIPS). They have accordingly neither
advanced nor impeded the multilateral discipline. The major exceptions have
been those agreements to which the US is a signatory. In one respect, these lat-
ter agreements have probably contributed to improving the implementation of
the TRIPS Agreement. That is, they have included specific obligations relating
to the administration and enforcement of domestic intellectual property laws.
However, the agreements have also included restrictions on the flexibilities,
such as the use of compulsory licensing, that are open to countries in the appli-
cation of TRIPS; and they have added new restrictions.17 In contrast, many
poorer countries have wanted to retain the flexibilities built into the TRIPS
Agreement, especially in the case of pharmaceuticals.f. Customs Procedures
Unpredictable or cumbersome customs procedures are well known as a
source of cost and delay in trade flows. Progress towards the international stan-
dardisation of some aspects of customs procedures has been made through the
WTO Agreement on Customs Valuation as well as through the work of the
World Customs Organization (WCO) in defining best practices. In the reform
and improvement of these procedures, regional and bilateral trade agreements
appear to have played a positive role. These agreements have proposed cooper-
ation between the parties to simplify and harmonise customs procedures – as,
for instance, in some cases through the introduction of a single administrative
form for customs clearance. Some have also envisaged cooperation in prevent-
ing breaches of customs laws and regulations. Agreements between developed17 The US Trade Act of 2002 stated that the objective of the US is to further promote adequate and
effective protection of intellectual property rights, in part through ‘ensuring that the provisions of
any multilateral or bilateral agreement governing intellectual property rights that is entered into by
the United States reflect a standard of protection similar to that found in United States law’.
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tries – have also provided for technical assistance to improve and modernise
customs procedures. These kinds of actions taken under FTAs can only have
positive spillover effects on the trade of third countries.g. Standards
Governments everywhere promulgate regulations whose intent is the protec-
tion of consumer safety and the environment, the health of human, animal and
plant life, and the prevention of deceptive practices. The diverse standards set
by individual countries, however, may also impede trade unnecessarily or be
misused as a hidden form of protection. The Agreements on Technical Barriers
to Trade (TBT) and on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) of the
WTO aim to lessen, or remove, such impediments. They do so by encouraging
the adoption of international standards, the harmonisation of national standards
or the mutual recognition of like standards. They also encourage the accredita-
tion of agencies located in partner countries that engage in testing and certifica-
tion procedures. The provisions of FTAs do not conflict with these multilateral
aims but, on the contrary, may serve to further them.
On TBTs, virtually all trade agreements include some provisions. Most fre-
quently, they confine themselves to reaffirming their rights and obligations
under the WTO TBT Agreement. Many also establish joint committees to fur-
ther cooperation in lessening these technical barriers. At a minimum, these
committees can enhance the flow of information. They can also be more
actively used to identify impediments that could readily be removed.
In some regional agreements, participants have given their cooperation con-
siderably more concrete expression. Members have sought to introduce common
standards for specific products. Harmonisation of detailed national specifica-
tions, however, is not easy since it means overcoming resistance to changes in
long-accustomed practices where the benefits accruing from the changes may
not be apparent to many firms in the affected industries. Thus, it was after many
years of such attempted harmonisation that the EU – a path breaker in this con-
text – was persuaded to take the alternative approach in which members accord
mutual recognition to each other’s regulations and procedures.
In some bilateral agreements, the parties have likewise set out quite detailed
and extensive arrangements for lessening TBTs. They have sought, where pos-
sible, to align their regulations with international standards or they have agreed
to engage in mutual recognition of each other’s standards. Probably, still more
important in facilitating the flow of trade has been the agreement of parties to
accept each other’s conformity-assessment procedures and to accredit the certi-
fying bodies in each other’s territories. Obviously, this kind of cooperation can
prove most feasible when the parties perceive that the underlying aims of each 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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of mutual trust in each other’s inspection, testing and accreditation procedures.
In regard to SPS measures, the WTO Agreement is rigorous in defining the
standards that national regulations must meet to qualify as legitimate con-
straints on trade. The Agreement, in effect, introduced a science-based standard
for assessing national regulations; if the regulations cannot be shown to be sci-
entifically justifiable, they cannot be invoked to impede imports.
Not all countries, however, have been equally enthusiastic in their embrace of
the SPS Agreement, and their FTAs express a more qualified acceptance of its
principles. Most conspicuously, the EU has taken the view that the science-based
rationale of the rules in the Agreement should yield, in some circumstances, to a
broader social rationale, a view that has not been shared by the US.18
Some have expressed the concern that, through the multiplication of FTAs,
the difference in approach between the US and the EU may lead to ‘regulatory
regionalism’. This concern has some validity, although the root cause lies not
in the multiplication of FTAs but in the inability to resolve differences at the
international level about what the standards and procedures should be. With the
accumulation of scientific evidence, it may well be that these differences will
be bridged over time.
Although it may be confined to a relatively small number of countries, the
work carried out under the auspices of regional and bilateral agreements evi-
dently contributes towards improving the implementation of the WTO Agree-
ments. It would be a mistake, however, to evaluate such work in isolation. The
work carried out under regional or bilateral agreements is part of a larger
endeavour. There is a substantial international network of agencies, both offi-
cial and private, that seek to define technical standards in specific sectors or
activities; and many countries have mutual recognition agreements relating to
regulations affecting specific products or services. However, a major limitation
of these varied activities is that they have been conducted largely by OECD
countries. A more inclusive approach is needed.h. Trade Remedy Measures
Trade remedy measures receive limited attention in the majority of FTAs.
Quite a number make no mention at all of these measures. Of the agreements
that do address the topic, almost all reaffirm their rights and obligations under
the WTO agreements, and the few that elaborate on these rights and obligations
mostly do so within the terms of these agreements.1918 The disputes between the EU and the US on hormone-fed beef and on GMOs that have been
taken to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body were outcomes of this difference in approach.
19 For an extensive analysis of trade remedy measures in regional and bilateral agreements,
see Teh et al. (2007).
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management of trade remedy measures. For example, as others have pointed
out, the conditions in Article XIX of GATT and the WTO Safeguard Agree-
ment are so phrased that they give rise to considerable uncertainty in their
application.20 According to the conditions, the import surges justifying the uni-
lateral introduction of protective measures should arise from ‘unforeseeable
developments’, should cause ‘serious injury’ to the industry and should be
identifiable as the source of the injury. There is room for wide differences in
the interpretation of these conditions, and FTAs offer no clarification.21 Again,
the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement leaves wide discretion to the individual
member countries in the procedures they follow and the criteria they apply, in
imposing anti-dumping duties. In FTAs, only a few tighten the conditions
under which such action may be taken.22
The treatment of countervailing duties in FTAs stands in interesting contrast
to the other trade remedies. The WTO Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Agreement provide a full definition of what constitutes actionable subsidies,
and it lays out procedures for assessing the duties. The discipline is clear and
virtually no FTAs include any qualification to its terms.i. Dispute Settlement
FTAs generally spell out a process for dispute settlement, although in some
cases it is no more than an undertaking to hold consultations on any disagree-
ment. In most agreements, however, a formally complete process is laid out
very much along the same lines as in the WTO. Parties to a dispute usually
have the option of taking any dispute to the WTO or to the body established
under the regional or bilateral trade agreement.23 This is interesting since it
implies that parties believe that their agreements are consistent with their rights
and obligations under the WTO. There should, in principle, be no conflict20 For a critique of the language of the GATT and WTO rules and the uncertainties to which they
give rise, see Sykes (2003). For a summary in the context of Dispute Settlement Body rulings, see
Brown and Stern (2009).
21 In NAFTA and other trade agreements to which the US is a signatory, a further element of arbi-
trariness is that participants may be exempted from any restrictions that they place on imports from
all other sources. This does not appear to comply with GATT ⁄ WTO rules, which call for non-
discriminatory application of the measures.
22 One significant exception is the agreement between Australia and New Zealand. In a 1990 proto-
col to the agreement, these countries chose to recognise that the maintenance of anti-dumping pro-
visions was inconsistent with the realisation of free trade between them, and that, thereafter, any
allegations of predatory pricing practices would be considered under the competition laws of the
two countries.
23 In NAFTA, disputes on certain issues – such as those concerning SPS measures – can be settled
only by the partner countries.
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may, of course, make different judgments.j. Competition Policy
Some FTAs have gone beyond the WTO disciplines to address other issues
that also affect commercial relations among countries. One such issue is com-
petition policy.24 Cross-border disputes about competition policy have repeat-
edly surfaced in relations between the EU, Japan and the US. These are likely
to multiply in the future, particularly as emerging countries, having dismantled
state controls and embraced some version of the market system, increasingly
feel the need to develop their own internal competition policies.
Competition policy – understood as policy relating to firms in the private
sector – may affect commercial relations among countries in several ways.25 In
the context of FTAs, however, it is first and foremost in relation to market
access that questions of competition policy may arise. Competition laws, or
their absence, may result in the apparent inability of foreign competitors to
gain market access, undermining the benefit expected from the negotiation of
reductions in trade barriers.26 A second major source of possible conflict is dis-
agreement over the propriety of competition rulings that affect a country’s
multinational corporations operating in another’s jurisdiction.27
For FTAs to make a contribution towards the resolution of such issues, some
convergence in the design and enforcement of national competition laws is
needed. But this is hard to realise. While we can say at a high level of general-
ity that countries’ competition laws generally share the common aims of pro-
moting efficiency and fairness, individual countries interpret these concepts
differently in the light of their own particular objectives and norms (Graham
and Richardson, 1997). Moreover, we should recall that there is not a settled
and unchanging body of economic doctrine about what constitutes anti-compet-
itive behaviour in all circumstances. What happens in practice is that national
laws are expressed in broad conceptual terms, leaving the enforcing agencies to
interpret and apply them in the specific circumstances of each case.24 In international trade relations, competition policy is often loosely understood to include govern-
mental measures that impede the competition of foreign enterprises. Thus, they can include govern-
mental regulations that prevent the operation of foreign enterprises in, say, the banking or airline
sectors. We are concerned here only with the anti-competitive conduct of firms in the private sector.
25 Tartullo (2000) provides a lucid exposition on the several ways in which cross-border conflicts
may arise between national competition policies.
26 This, for example, was the substance of several complaints that the US brought against Japan in
the 1980s and 1990s.
27 The US and the EU, for example, have had disagreements about proposed mergers of major
aircraft and pharmaceutical companies, holding different views on how the mergers might affect
competition in their markets.
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national competition laws. Many agreements make no reference to the issue at
all, but of those that do, the substance relating to competition policy proper –
the laws concerning the conduct of firms in the private sector – is almost
always limited to general statements of purpose or principle.28 They affirm
their intent to pursue competition policies that will realise such broad aims as
the promotion of efficiency and consumer welfare, or the protection of the ben-
efits of trade liberalisation measures. It is made clear, however, that this is to
be accomplished through the enforcement of the national competition laws of
each country.
Some FTAs contain another provision that contributes more positively to the
lessening of possible cross-border conflicts over competition issues. Accepting
that national laws differ, they have looked to promote cooperation in the
enforcement of these laws. Cooperation between the enforcing agencies can
over time not only promote a better mutual understanding of national laws and
enforcement procedures, but can also facilitate the exchange of information on
the conduct of businesses alleged to be engaging in anti-competitive practices.
This encourages adoption of the legal concept of comity which, in the present
context, means that each party’s competition agency undertakes to carry out
investigations of firms operating within its jurisdiction when their conduct
allegedly harms the interest of the other party. Of course, commitments to such
mutual assistance are not conditional on the negotiation of FTAs. Several
OECD countries, in fact, have bilateral arrangements that extend cooperation
on procedural matters to include the reciprocity implied in the principle of
comity.
Bilateral or regional trade agreements cannot address all the competition
issues that arise in international commercial relations. Egregious anti-competi-
tive practices of international cartels are a case in point. A broader approach,
such as that pursued by the Competition Law and Policy Committee of the
OECD, or by UNCTAD, has to be taken.29 What we need to note in the pres-
ent context is the very modest contribution that FTAs have made, or are likely
to make, in lessening conflicts over competition policies. Closer cooperation28 In some FTAs, most notably those to which the US is a signatory, a major part of the chapter
on competition policy is devoted to the conduct of state monopolies or state-owned enterprises.
The primary stipulation is that in so far as these monopolies or enterprises are granted powers
affecting other firms, such as the issue of licences, these powers should be exercised in a non-
discriminatory way. While a legitimate concern, this falls into the broader category of government
obstacles to open competition and goes beyond our more limited definition of competition policy.
29 For a discussion of proposals along these lines, see Tartullo (2000, pp. 499–503). See also
Graham and Richardson (1997) for a more ambitious set of proposals. McGinnis (2003) sets out a
modest proposal for the inclusion in the WTO of an explicit commitment to apply competition laws
in a non-discriminatory way to foreign firms. The ability to invoke the WTO dispute-settlement
machinery would be cases in which market access was at issue.
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assist each other in the enforcement of their own laws.k. Labour Standards
Some developed countries, most notably the US and the EU, have insisted
on the inclusion of clauses on labour standards in the FTAs to which they are
parties. They have been acting partly in response to general concerns about
human rights and partly to allay fears that competition from poorer countries
may be unfair because of exploitative working conditions.
From the viewpoint of the advocates of labour standards, the advantage of
their inclusion in FTAs is that they can be tied to trade sanctions in some form.
For instance, in several agreements to which the US is a partner, breaches of
standards can attract monetary penalties. However, the effectiveness of such
arrangements is open to doubt. It is noteworthy that, under the post-NAFTA
trade agreements signed by the US, no labour dispute has reached the Office of
the US Trade Representative (USTR). One disincentive is that, because of dis-
parities between the labour standards as stated in the agreements and the
domestic labour laws of the US, any actions by the USTR could expose a num-
ber of these laws to legal challenge (Bolle, 2008).
As we have discussed elsewhere (Brown and Stern, 2008), the inclusion of
labour standards in trade agreements raises some major concerns. Many coun-
tries with low labour costs fear that such provisions may be abused for protec-
tionist purposes. It is, moreover, very difficult to arrive at unambiguous
definitions of labour standards that are mutually acceptable and sufficiently spe-
cific for dispute-settlement purposes. Although agreed international labour con-
ventions may be taken as a guide, these are expressed in broad terms and leave
much to interpretation by national courts and labour tribunals. It is thus not sur-
prising that trade agreements have tended to confine themselves to a require-
ment that trading partners enforce their own national labour laws. Further,
there are grounds for scepticism about the effectiveness of trade or monetary
penalties as means of bringing about improvements in domestic standards.
Improvements in labour standards are closely bound up with developments that
are essentially domestic, namely, rising levels of living and the associated
changes in social norms. To many, the moral suasion exercised through the
ILO and other channels appears a more effective external influence than penal-
ties embodied in trade agreements.l. Environmental Standards
There are a large number of environmental agreements dealing with specific
environmental matters. Some of these provide for the use of trade measures, 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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The WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment also has, as a standing
item on its agenda, the study of the relations between environmental agree-
ments and the WTO disciplines. However, apart from these modest links, envi-
ronmental agreements and the multilateral trading system stand apart from
each other as separate endeavours. It is equally the case that, in regional and
bilateral trade agreements, the inclusion of environmental provisions is the
exception rather than the rule. Many agreements make no mention at all of
environmental matters. It is only in agreements to which the US is a party that
trading partners accept a decided obligation to abide by specified environmen-
tal standards, facing possible trade penalties in the event of failure to comply.
The environmental provisions in US trade agreements are modelled after
the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) that
the US negotiated with Canada and Mexico after NAFTA had been signed.30
The essence of the provisions of the NAAEC and of subsequent bilateral trade
agreements has been, not the setting of common or minimal standards for the
participating countries, but a requirement that the parties enforce their own
existing environmental laws. They have not differed in intent from the agree-
ments or understandings on environmental cooperation that the US has negoti-
ated, quite separately from trade agreements, with a number of other countries
on a broad range of environmental issues. The innovative element in including
these provisions in trade agreements is the incorporation of procedures that
ostensibly allow for countries to be called to account in the event that they
appear to be failing in enforcing their own laws. Further, if a country does not
mend its ways, it may be required to pay a monetary assessment or even – as a
last resort – to face the withdrawal of a trade benefit.4. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS: SOME BROADER PROSPECTS
When we consider the likely part played by FTAs in future global gover-
nance, we should bear in mind two major changes that are taking place in
international trade relations. First, the WTO is losing its central role as the
prime mover in the liberalisation of border barriers to trade. In the earlier dec-
ades after the Second World War, the core of trade liberalisation was the reci-
procal tariff reductions negotiated among the industrial countries in GATT on
the basis of general MFN treatment. In the last two decades, however, the
greater part of the liberalisation of border barriers has taken place unilaterally
– mostly by developing countries – while the main interest of the developed
countries has shifted to the part played by domestic regulations in impeding30 See Charnovitz (1994) for details.
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the critical importance of multilateral negotiations in lowering trade barriers
has been receding. Second, we are moving away from a world in which the US
has acted as the sole dominant power, interacting mainly with the EU countries
in formulating international trade policies. Both the US and the EU are now
increasingly required to share the management of the multilateral system with
emerging market and developing countries, particularly with Brazil, China and
India. In brief, so long as globalisation moves forward, the WTO is likely to
retain its significance, although less as a body focused on trade liberalisation
and more as the multilateral institution responsible for defining and overseeing
compliance with global norms, principles and rules of trade conduct. Extension
of its disciplines, however, will be more constrained by the diverse interests of
a wider and more disparate group of countries.
We cannot say whether, in the aftermath of the recent recession and financial
crisis, regional and bilateral trade agreements will continue to multiply or how
far existing agreements will be strengthened. In particular, there is some con-
cern, as expressed, for example, in Aggarwal and Evenett (2010), about the
introduction of ‘behind-the-border’ barriers to deal with the effects of the reces-
sion, currency imbalance and exchange-rate management. Nonetheless, it seems
quite likely that regional and bilateral agreements will gradually play an increas-
ing role in the global governance of commercial relations. We see two reasons
for optimism about their future interaction with the multilateral system estab-
lished under the auspices of the WTO, and we see one reason for pessimism.a. Diminishing Tariff Preferences
In the matter of market access, the formation of regional or bilateral trade
agreements has been a deliberate act of divergence from a multilateral system
that is based on non-discrimination. What can be said of these agreements,
however, is that none have raised their general MFN tariff barriers against third
countries. In thus conforming to GATT Article XXIV, they have lessened the
fear that mutually exclusive trading blocs might emerge. In fact, because the
long-term trend since the Second World War has been towards the progressive
lowering of MFN tariffs, tariff preferences have slowly diminished.
What can we expect over the next 10 to 20 years? So long as the decline in
US political hegemony and the emergence of a multipolar world does not result
in its political fragmentation into hostile blocs, it is likely that economic and
technological forces will persist in making for closer, global economic integra-
tion. So, provided that trade measures do not become more widespread and
severe because of domestic economic problems and a failure in the exchange-
rate and payments system to adjust to changing circumstances, the trend
towards lowering trade barriers is unlikely to be halted. 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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the last 20 years. With the industrial countries having less to offer in the way
of reductions in trade barriers that they are willing to put on the bargaining
table, multilateral trade negotiations offer diminishing returns in the field of
trade liberalisation. The world will rely still more on unilateral reductions of
trade barriers to decide the pace of liberalisation. This implies a slower rate
that will not please the committed free traders, but it has the benefit that coun-
tries will decide how far and how fast to open their markets on the basis of
their own policy preferences.
There is, then, a reasonable, if fairly distant, prospect that the network of
tariff preferences and other preferential barriers arising from FTAs will gradu-
ally fade in importance. It is quite conceivable that, if the many regional or
bilateral agreements now envisaged actually bring most tariffs to zero, this
could advance the world towards multilateral free trade in numerous products.
The developed countries already have zero tariffs on many products and if
agreements in the developing world eliminated tariffs on their intra-trade in
similar products, multilateral agreements establishing free trade in particular
sub-sectors might become feasible. The agreements would be based not on
reciprocal bargaining but on the recognition of collective interest. They could
be modelled on the International Technology Agreement to which countries
voluntarily became signatories and which came into effect only when the total
number of signatories accounted for 90 per cent of world trade.b. Regulatory Cooperation
To a major degree, expanding commercial relations now depend upon the
forging of agreements that lessen the regulatory impediments to external trade
that many domestic regulations, unintentionally or not, give rise to. This has
motivated the search for some convergence in national standards and pro-
cedures. The common international rules of the WTO and the network of
mutual recognition agreements among individual countries are practical
instruments of these endeavours.
These, however, are not isolated activities. Convergence in the rules and pro-
cedures affecting commercial relations among countries rests upon the growing
international infrastructure of cooperation that exists among national regulatory
agencies and among numerous private and semi-private bodies like scientific,
professional or industry groups that are concerned with common standards and
procedures. Many have formal organisations at the international level where
information is exchanged and discussed and where shared standards or pro-
cedures are enunciated or best practices defined. An instance is the Codex
Alimentarius Commission serviced by the FAO ⁄ WHO that defines health and
safety standards affecting human, animal and plant well-being, and we have 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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the less formal consultations among national competition agencies in imple-
menting competition laws. There are a great many more such endeavours.
Without such an infrastructure, both formal and informal, it would be much
less feasible for governments to reach agreement on broad rules in the WTO
that require countries to conform to shared standards and procedures. In this
sense, it is misleading to view governance by the WTO of the multilateral trad-
ing system solely as a hierarchical arrangement in which a higher central body
defines rules of conduct that are thereafter passed down for enforcement by the
individual member countries. The process has to be preceded by the emergence
of some consensus on what the rules should be; and that depends on an exten-
sive exchange of information, on analysis and on discussion among specialised
national agencies. Regional and bilateral trade agreements can pay a positive
role in this process by promoting cooperation among the regulatory agencies
and raising their levels of mutual trust in each other’s practices.
Some may argue that, because of such cooperative measures, firms in mem-
ber countries of regional or bilateral agreements are likely to enjoy an advan-
tage over competing firms from third countries. Their trading costs may be
lowered by streamlined procedures, and they may face fewer regulatory hurdles
in introducing new products. This could be seen as a violation of the principle
of non-discrimination. There is, however, nothing necessarily exclusive about
their preferential status; other countries could arrange for equivalent treatment.
Indeed, we could expect competition to result in the more general adoption of
better practices.c. WTO-plus Provisions
The most controversial aspect of some regional or bilateral agreements is
that they include provisions that extend beyond the range of WTO disciplines.
Proponents of these WTO-plus agreements often defend them on the grounds
that they are vehicles for making innovations in the management of multilateral
trade relations. This may be true of some provisions. Trade agreements may
not only clarify, or facilitate, implementation of WTO disciplines; they may
also point the way towards an extension of these disciplines. We have noted
earlier, for instance, how the inclusion of competition policy in some agree-
ments may contribute towards greater collaboration among national competition
agencies and to a consequent lessening of certain trade conflicts. However, the
most striking feature of one group of bilateral trade agreements – those
between large rich countries and small poor countries – is the great asymmetry
in bargaining power between the parties to the agreements, and this shows up
in the inclusion of provisions in their agreements that would not be acceptable
among countries less unevenly balanced in power. 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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instances in which the inclusion of WTO-plus provisions has no explanation
other than such asymmetry of power. In the provisions relating to investment
capital, for instance, the US has insisted that portfolio investment be freely
transferable even in circumstances of currency or financial crisis, virtually pro-
hibiting the possible use of temporary capital controls or other restrictive meas-
ures. In view of the vulnerability of developing countries to externally
generated instability, this appears to subsume the public interest of weaker trad-
ing partners to the private interest of US financial concerns. Likewise, some
provisions relating to IP have placed restrictions on the manufacture of generic
drugs by poor countries that are noticeably more limiting than those stipulated
in the WTO discipline. Again, the bilateral agreements to which the US is a
party include provisions on labour and environmental standards that place intru-
sive obligations on trading partners.
These kinds of additional provisions can be sincerely (if self-righteously)
advanced on the grounds that, despite the objections of trading partners, they
are not merely self-interested but also work for the good of the trading partner,
at least in the long run. But the economic reasoning that supports this line of
argument is always open to challenge, and the imposition of such provisions is
not in any case the action of a just nation. Provisions should not be imposed
on weaker trading partners that they – and other disinterested observers – per-
ceive to be unfair. To use bilateral agreements in this way weakens inter-
national confidence in the commitment of powerful nations to multilateral
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